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Abstract 
In the 1990s, most of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) went through 
radical liberalization and adopted large-scale economic and political reform programs. These 
programs included almost complete price, trade and capital movement liberalization, 
macroeconomic stabilization, currency reform, and small-scale and large-scale privatization. 
What is the role of the development of a legal and institutional infrastructure along with these 
radical changes in society and the economy? The first part of this paper is based on the results 
of an interview study of entrepreneurs and managers in Estonia undertaken in 1998 and in 
Estonia, Russia, Finland and Sweden in 2000 in order to obtain their view of the behavior of 
government agencies, lawmaking procedures and the operation of law enforcement 
mechanisms.   
     The second part of this paper presents summary results from interview surveys of Estonian 
manufacturing firms undertaken from 1994-2000. The surveys were designed to 
quantitatively measure the state of and changes in the Estonian business environment, 
focusing on the key aspects of financial contractual relationships of Estonian manufacturing 
firms as well as regulation and dispute resolution mechanisms. Among the observations it is 
noted that government regulations do not seriously affect business decisions regarding the 
operation, expansion or closing down of Estonian manufacturing firms. A second observation 
is that the Estonian court system is perceived as inadequate for resolving a substantial number 
of disputes and conflicts among economic agents although legislation exists. Most firms rely 
on mechanisms of self-enforcement when possible. 
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1. Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the former Soviet bloc countries began  
programs to reform their economic and political environments. One of the most successful of 
the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) has  been Estonia.  In little more than a 
decade it has affected almost complete price, trade and capital movement liberalization, 
macroeconomic stabilization, currency reform and small- and large-scale privatization. 
Among the newly admitted countries to the European Union it is a model of free market 
reform.  That Estonia has managed to make such headway in the face of a legal and 
institutional infrastructure calcified by years of Soviet central planning, makes the 
accomplishment even more remarkable, even from an Estonian perspective.   
 
This paper attempts to provide a glimpse of the role legal and institutional infrastructure plays 
when paired with radical changes in society and the economy.  By direct interviews with  
Estonian entrepreneurs and managers,  we provide a case study of financial market 
development in a transition economy. The focus is on two dimensions: 1) the quality of legal 
and state institutions that hold special importance for the financial sector  and 2) the financing 
choices of  firms and the constraints put upon them in financial markets by this existent 
infrastructure. 
 
 Before presenting the  Estonian case study itself, it can be helpful to review what has been 
written and said about the economic aspects of a transition process. Thus, Section 2 takes a 
look at  some of the factors influencing the success of transition, as identified within the 
framework of the New Institutional Economics.   
 
 Section 3  of  this paper presents  results from a special interview study of Estonian 
entrepreneurs and managers undertaken  in 1998 and 2000.  A questionnaire similar to the 
one used by Borner and Weder (1995) was used.  Taking results from the survey with 128 
respondents in 1998 and 142 respondents in 2000, we attempt to give a general picture of the 
behavior of government agencies, legislative procedures and law enforcement mechanisms.  
The Estonian  results are then compared  with results of a similar survey administered  in 
Russia (132 respondents,) Finland (65 respondents) and Sweden (63 respondents) in 2000.  
Respondents for these countries were top managers from various industries with firms located 
mainly in large towns. 
 
 Section 4 presents a number of  results from an Estonian  interview study of manufacturing 
firms, undertaken on a yearly basis from 1994-2000 (for more details, see Vensel and 
Wihlborg 2001). The study was designed to capture and quantitatively measure the state of 
and changes in the Estonian business environment, focusing on the study of financial 
contractual relationships of Estonian manufacturing firms (the market environment aspect), 
but also including issues related to regulation mechanisms, dispute resolution mechanisms 
etc. (the non-market aspect). The main focus of this paper is on the most important factors 
influencing firms’ financing and investment decisions. Between fifty and seventy firms 
responded to questionnaires during each interview round.  
 
2.The Transition Process  
 
There are several obstacles hindering the transformation of a formerly centrally-planned 
economy such as Estonia’s into a well-functioning market economy. Underdevelopment of 
the legal system seems to be one of the most important limits to economic growth in 
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transitional  countries.  The most relevant issues in the underdevelopment of legal 
infrastructure include: 1) the  incompleteness of major areas of law,  2) the lack of 
independence and specialization in the judiciary and,  3) the  absence of mechanisms 
necessary for the court to enforce its decisions. Recent studies in developing and transition 
countries indicate that public sector corruption, which has ramifications within the legal 
system,  is another major obstacle to the growth process of a developing country. 
 
Yet despite the presence of these and other obstacles,  Estonia has made good headway in 
overhauling its business environment. Among the reforms it has carried out are the following:  
 
• privatization and restructuring of formerly state-owned enterprises in all industries 
• development of the private sector in order to establish a competitive business 
environment, replacing planned allocation of resources and concentrated production 
• restructuring of the financial sector, especially the development of a private commercial 
banking system, and the development of the financial markets 
• liberalization of prices, capital movements, and international trade regime 
• monetary reform and the introduction of  a stable convertible domestic currency 
• defining the new role of government, development of budgetary discipline, introduction 
of market-oriented fiscal instruments and social security programs, etc. 
 
•         At present, more than ten years’ experience of transition to a market economy in 
CEECs exists.1 According to Gomulka (2000, pp.18-19), policymakers have learned a 
number of lessons from the transition process with respect to requirements for a 
successful reform process: 
 
1) The rapid creation of institutional, legal, microeconomic and macroeconomic conditions 
are essential for the development and growth of a new private sector, both domestic and 
foreign. 
2) New private sector development requires measures to increase competition, such as 
liberalizing prices, permitting SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) to sell capital assets, 
imposing hard budget constraints on SOEs, encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and lowering entry barriers for new businesses. 
3) Inflation rates need not need to be very low, but they must not exceed 40% annually and 
should converge with the average level in the EU. 
4) A disinflation policy should involve all the key macroeconomic components: fiscal (tight 
fiscal policy), monetary (the cost of disinflation is lower if monetary authorities are 
politically independent, the extreme solution being currency board arrangements (CBAs), 
exchange rate policy; and wages and benefits policy where applicable 
5) An independent central bank (CB) and a solid regulatory framework for financial 
institutions are essential as is a stable macroeconomic environment. 
6) Since external credibility is vital to attract FDI and eliminate capital flight, the exchange 
rate should be competitive, but the choice of exchange rate regime is not crucial. The 
exchange rate should ensure that international reserves are high relative to imports and 
foreign debt, especially short-term debt 
                                                     
1 Descriptions and broad analyses of the transition process can be found in, for example, Dillon and Wykoff, 
2002; Golodko, 2002; Tumpel-Gugerelli et al., 2002, Mitra and Selowsky, 2002; Campos and Corricelli, 2002; 
and Orlowski, 2001 and Wyploz, 1999. 
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7) Fiscal policy should aim to meet the Maastricht budget deficit and public debt limits, and 
to keep taxes low relative to GDP. Public spending should favor education and 
infrastructure at the expense of social transfers, defense, and subsidies 
8) A high rate of structural unemployment requires changes in the labor code in order to 
increase labor market flexibility and active participation by the government in education 
and training 
9) Most former SOEs, especially large ones, have suffered from “the British Leyland/Rover 
syndrome”-- i.e. the accumulation of structural problems of such magnitude that they are 
not amenable to significant “strategic” restructuring and growth (financial, managerial, 
and other constraints and poor positive incentives) 
 
There is of course substantial interdependence among these requirements but we focus here on 
those explained by points 1, 2 and 5 -- points which primarily refer to financial market 
developments. Here, what is needed already in the earliest phases of transition is referred to by 
Kornai (1993) as financial discipline: “Financial discipline, as I see it, means the enforcement 
of four simple rules: 1) buyers: pay for the goods you buy; 2) debtors: abide by your loan 
contract; pay back your debt; 3) taxpayers: pay your taxes; 4) enterprises: cover your costs 
out of your revenues” (op. cit., 1993, p. 315). 
 
Looking at the subject of corporate governance arrangements, Winkler (2000) emphasizes the 
key role they play in overall performance of a transition economy. Citing the Macedonian 
experience, he argues that when a country’s macroeconomic policy changes dramatically 
while the market infrastructure stays more or less the same, serious corporate governance 
problems arise. He also concludes that “[m]ost bank owners still regard their institutions as 
instruments for meeting their own liquidity requirements, so that they still deserve to be 
regarded as “market-distorting” rather than “market-supporting institutions” (op. cit., p. 280). 
 
On the basis of the Bulgarian experience, Peev (2000) focuses on the particular features of 
so-called “crony capitalism” as a major hindrance. He points out that crony capitalism tends 
to thrive when institutional constraints (property rights, governance structures, market 
institutions) are undeveloped; there is a post-socialist rent-seeking culture; and quasi-state 
officials, quasi-owners, and quasi-managers have a short-term perspectives. (see Peev, 2000, 
p.349). 
 
Examining the Russian experience, Buiter (2000) argues that insecure property rights and 
widespread predation, including rent seeking,lobbying, influence-seeking, theft, involuntary 
and unrequited transfer of property rights, extortion, as well as threats and actual violence 
against personal property, have depressed capital formation in all its dimensions: private, 
public, physical, human and environmental (see op. cit., pp. 603-604). Even international 
financial institutions are unable to make a significant contribution to the emergence and 
development of civil society in Russia and other transition economies; they can make only 
limited, albeit important, contributions to the governments’ reform programs.  
 
 In this paper the New Institutional Economics (NIE) definition of a “firm” is used; a firm is 
“a network of relational contracts between individuals … with the purpose of efficiently 
organizing production” (Furubotn and Richter, 1998, p. 272). According to the NIE approach, 
three fundamental types of institutions, the market, the firm, and the state, have to be looked 
at in interaction. In other words, the tight links between the macroeconomy and the corporate 
sector are recognized. These links are two-way: (1) macroeconomic developments can affect 
the health of the corporate sector, especially if firms have to do business in an environment 
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that does not promote sound corporate governance and firms are highly leveraged; (2) the 
corporate sector can affect the macroeconomy through various channels and the prolonged 
period needed for corporate restructuring can significantly impair economic growth. Several 
researchers use an institutional approach to explain why the transition process is so complex 
and why it comes in so many shapes and forms (Moers, 2002; Van der Mortel, 2002).    
 
There are three distinct aspects of poor economic governance in transition: First, excessive 
government intervention and discretion (regulation of private entities, adoption of preferential 
schemes) as well as trade restrictions, price controls, directed credits, tax exemptions, etc. can 
provide opportunities for elicit bribes and/or kickbacks; Second, lack of government 
transparency and accountability as well as poor management hinder the establishment of an 
efficient civil service that can avoid conflicts of interest, develop an open budgetary process, 
and establish an efficient tax system; Third, the absence of a stable, rule-based, competitive 
environment cuts of nourishment for market activities.  
 
       While there are many traditionally accepted reasons why some countries lag behind 
others in the reform process -- to wit: unfavorable starting conditions (more years spent 
under the communist system; greater distance from the West and the incentive of EU 
accession; landlocked status, as is the case of Central Asia and the Caucasus; over-
industrialization; civil conflicts) -- other reasons are more unconventional. For example, 
Havrylyshyn and Odling-Smee (2000) suggest that economic reform has been thwarted by 
rent-seeking vested interests. As they see it, some one always stands to gain if reforms stall 
halfway through the reform agenda. The stagnation of transition may be due as much to 
vested interests as to poor initial conditions. Thus, the old party and managerial elite 
(nomenklatura) may well become,  ironically, the winners of partial reform: It quickly 
becomes clear that they can “reap much higher profits by obtaining privileges in a system 
marked by continuing government interventions than by setting up risky new ventures to 
restructure old, inefficient industries or starting up new companies” (op cit, 8).    
 
      Operation of the enforcement mechanism is very important, and if this mechanism does 
not function well, self-enforcement mechanisms are needed to fill the void. However, as 
Klein and Murphy point out, “transactors cannot rely entirely on self-enforcement, because 
the magnitude of the private sanction that can be imposed for non-performance is limited” 
(1997, 417). The strategy of private enforcement of public rules may sometimes serve 
emerging market economies well in the short and medium run, but judicial enforcement is 
surely the ultimate goal of legal reforms. The economic role of the state during the transition 
process is clearly defined by Frye and Shleifer (1997) and can be characterized by means of 
three basic models, as shown later in Table 1. 
 
       In this paper the development of state and legal institutions of particular importance for 
financial market development is studied with particular emphasis on Estonia in comparison 
with Russia and Nordic neighbors. Furthermore, we study how financial market 
developments have affected the pattern of firm financing. 
 
 
3. Government Agency Behavior, Law Making Procedures and the Operation of Law 
Enforcement Mechanisms 
In order to get a general picture of the role Estonian infrastructure plays in the development 
of financial markets, we created a questionnaire designed to probe the experiences of 
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business heads vis a vis government agencies, the courts and civil servants. The results of 
these interviews in 1998 and 2000 are presented  in Table 2;  thereafter,  results are discussed. 
 
      Similar questions were also posed to an equivalent group in Russia and two Nordic 
countries -- Sweden and Finland -- and results for the year 2000 compared with those of 
Estonia. It should be noted that because Russia is so diverse, we broke the Russian results 
down to four categories: Russia overall, then the separate cities Moscow, Kaliningrad and St. 
Petersburg.   
 
 
 
Table 1. The Economic Role of the State during Transition 
 
Model Legal Environment Regulatory Environment 
Invisible 
Hand 
Government is not above the law and uses 
power to supply minimal public goods. 
Courts enforce contracts. 
Government follows the rules. 
Regulation is minimal. Little 
corruption. 
Helping  
Hand 
Government is above the law but uses power 
to help some businesses. State officials 
enforce contracts. 
Government aggressively 
regulates to promote some 
businesses. Organised 
corruption. 
Grabbing 
Hand 
Government is above the law and uses 
power to extract rents. The legal system 
does not work. The mafia replaces the state 
as enforcer. 
Predatory regulations. 
Disorganised corruption and 
bribery. Bureaucrats adopt 
Helping Hand rhetoric 
Source: Frye and Shleifer, 1997, p. 355. 
 
 
3.1 The Behavior of Government Agencies 
 
Our  interview subjects were asked over a two year period to evaluate the operation of 
government agencies, legislative procedures and enforcement mechanisms in terms of the day 
to day dealings with civil servants and other agents of the  government and judicial system. 
Questions were framed so as to permit respondents to express how rarely or frequently they 
met up with certain obstacles. For example, the variable “Civil Servants’ Arbitrariness” is a 
result of the question: Please evaluate to what extent the following statement applies in 
Estonia: “Laws and regulations are so complicated, unclear and sometimes even 
contradictory that it is impossible to adhere to them on a regular basis. Therefore, civil 
servants can always find ways and means of giving you a hard time (long delays, arbitrary 
decisions etc.). This happens: never (1), rarely (2), sometimes (3), frequently (4), mostly (5), 
or always (6).” 
 
As can be seen in part 1 of Table 2,  “civil servants’ arbitrariness”  was a major complaint of 
the 128 respondents, who stated this was something  they encountered “frequently”(with an 
average rating of  3.74 in 1998 and 3.49 in 2000 and a low standard deviation of 0.90 and 
0.83 respectively.) In 2000, 56 respondents (39.4%) said that civil servants frequently give 
them a hard time and 57 respondents (40.1%) answered that this happens sometimes. Neither 
in 1998 nor in 2000 did one single respondent answer that this never happens. We may 
conclude that civil servants’ arbitrariness is considered a problem in Estonian society.  
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     All other variables were formulated on the basis of analogous questions. With regard to 
the variable “will to insist on rights”, respondents gave “sometimes” an average rating of 
3.23 in 1998 and 3.08 in 2000, (but the standard deviation of 1.57 and 1.46 respectively was 
high). The majority of the respondents answered that they either “rarely” demonstrated their 
will to insist on rights (35.9% of respondents in 1998 and 34.5% in 2000) or “sometimes” did 
so (25.0% and 24.6% respectively). The will to insist on rights in the face of civil servants’ 
 
Table 2 Estimates of Government Agency Behavior, Law Making  
Procedures and Law Enforcement Mechanisms in Estonia 
 
 Year Never 
(1)
R
arely 
(2) 
Som
etim
es 
(3) 
Frequently 
 
(4)
M
ostly 
(5)
A
lw
ays 
(6) 
M
ean 
SD
 
1. Government Agency Behavior: 
1998 0 7 48 47 23 3 3.74 0.90Civil servants’ arbitrariness 
2000 0 15 57 56 13 1 3.49 0.83
1998 9 46 32 9 12 20 3.23 1.57Will to insist on rights 
2000 13 49 35 18 12 15 3.08 1.46
1998 8 41 47 26 3 3 2.88 1.03Civil servants’ misuse of 
power 2000 19 48 46 21 2 6 2.70 1.17
1998 2 4 23 36 41 22 4.38 1.15Knowing a civil servant 
personally – speeding up 
procedures 
2000 0 9 41 39 25 28 4.16 1.22
1998 13 22 38 32 19 4 3.27 1.28Knowing a civil servant 
personally – influencing 
his or her decisions 
2000 9 33 54 25 17 4 3.14 1.18
2. Law-Making Procedures: 
1998 3 34 51 28 9 3 3.12 1.03Predictability of law 
2000 9 27 78 26 2 0 2.89 0.82
1998 7 39 39 18 24 1 3.13 1.22Information availability 
2000 2 29 47 31 29 4 3.48 1.15
1998 66 38 18 4 2 0 1.73 0.93Opportunities to voice 
one’s concerns and 
opinions  
2000 56 41 17 17 11 0 2.20 1.29
1998 7 42 48 22 9 0 2.88 0.99Credibility of Government 
announcements  2000 8 26 63 26 17 2 3.17 1.08
3. Law Enforcement Mechanisms: 
1998 1 26 50 35 15 0 3.30 0.96Objectivity of courts 
2000 1 20 53 46 19 3 3.50 0.99
1998 0 7 27 45 41 8 4.13 1.00Power of money on the 
decisions 2000 0 16 44 34 40 8 3.86 1.12
1998 3 38 47 29 7 4 3.09 1.06Knowing the judge 
personally 2000 3 31 48 35 18 7 3.39 1.17
1998 1 5 23 13 38 48 4.77 1.28Turning to a higher court 
2000 0 4 21 26 46 45 4.75 1.14
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arbitrariness is thus apparently not high, and respondents seem to be of the opinion that 
insistence is mostly useless. 
 
Respondents claim that civil servants are able to misuse their power “sometimes” (an average 
estimate of 2.88, with a standard deviation of 1.03 in 1998; 2.70 and 1.17 in 2000). In 2000, 
46 respondents (32.4%) answered that civil servants are able to misuse power “sometimes”, 
48 respondents (33.8%) that this is “rarely” possible, and 21 respondents (14.8%) that this is 
“frequently” possible. It is interesting that respondents evaluated civil servants’ arbitrariness 
as a more relevant problem than the risk of them misusing  power. In any case, problems 
related to civil servants’ misuse of power (for example, in cases of blackmail) are relevant in 
Estonian society. 
 
The next two variables are connected with cases in which the economic agent knows the civil 
servant personally. Most of the respondents stated that knowing the civil servant personally 
speeds up different procedures “frequently”, with an average estimate of 4.38 in 1998 and 
4.16 in 2000. This can be dangerous, especially in a small society, as it could generate the 
basis for widespread cronyism. The variable “knowing a civil servant personally - influencing 
his or her decisions” was evaluated by respondents as being something they took advantage 
of “sometimes”, with an average rating of 3.27 in 1998 and 3.14 in 2000. It is also quite 
interesting that knowing the civil servant speeds up a concrete procedure “frequently”, but in 
most cases influences the decisions of the civil servant only “sometimes”. In any case, 
knowing civil servants personally affects their decision-making, and may especially speed up 
the relevant procedures. 
 
Comparative estimates of government agency behavior in Russia as a whole and in Moscow, 
St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad in particular, as well as in Finland and in Sweden in 2000 are 
presented in Table 3. Although Estonia is somewhere between Russia and its Western 
neighbors, it is clearly closest to Russia. For example, while civil servants’ arbitrariness is 
estimated in Russia and in Estonia as something that is encountered “frequently”, with 
average rates of 4.17 in Russia in 2000, compared with3.74 points in Estonia in 1998 and 
3.49 in 2000), this phenomenon is estimated as “rarely” encountered in Finland and in 
Sweden, with average ratings of 2.09 and 2.28 points, respectively. The same quite clear 
differences exist with regard to the other characteristics of government agency behavior on 
the list. 
 
3.2 Legislative Procedures 
 
The variables characterizing legislative procedures in Estonia are presented in panel 2 of 
Table 2. The variable “predictability of law” is a result of the question: “As an entrepreneur, 
do you regularly have to cope with unexpected changes in laws and/or policies which could 
seriously affect your business? Changes in the law and policies are predictable: never, i.e. 
changes are completely unpredictable (1), rarely, i.e. they are mostly unpredictable (2), 
sometimes, i.e. they are frequently unpredictable (3), frequently, i.e. they are fairly 
predictable (4), mostly, i.e. they are highly predictable (5), or always, i.e. they are completely 
predictable (6).” Respondents evaluated changes in laws and/or policies as being 
“sometimes”  predictable. The average score was 3.12 in 1998 and 2.89 in 2000. The 
standard deviations were 1.03 and 0.82). In 2000, 18.3% responded that they were mostly 
unpredictable. The figures in table 3 indicate that neither Estonia nor Russia are less 
predictable than Sweden and Finland. The score in Finland is actually the lowest. 
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Table 3 Estimates of Government Agency Behavior, Legislative Procedures, 
 and Law Enforcement Mechanisms in Different Countries (Scale 1-6) 
 
Estonia  
1998 2000 
R
ussia 
2000 
M
oscow
  
St. 
Petersburg 
 K
aliningrad 
Finland 
2000 
Sw
eden 
2000 
Government Agency Behavior         
• Civil servants’ obstinacy 3.74 3.49 4.17 3.93 4.10 4.33 2.09 2.28
• Will to insist on rights 3.23 3.08 2.73 2.63 2.93 2.64 4.06 4.41
• Civil servants’ misuse of 
power 
2.88 2.70 3.21 4.00 2.95 3.00 1.91 2.08
• Knowing a civil servant 
personally – speeding up the 
procedure 
 
4.38
 
4.16
 
4.39
 
4.63
 
4.15
 
4.44 
 
2.52 2.41
• Knowing a civil servant 
personally – influencing 
his/her decision 
 
3.27
 
3.14
 
4.45
 
4.83
 
3.90
 
4.64 
 
2.06 2.03
Legislative Procedures   
• Predictability of law 3.12 2.89 3.14 3.23 3.05 3.16 2.34 3.05
• Information availability 3.13 3.48 3.52 3.57 3.07 3.80 4.85 4.44
• Opportunities to voice one’s 
concerns and opinions  
1.73 2.20 1.73 1.50 1.85 1.77 4.45 3.65
• Credibility of government 
announcements 
 
2.88
 
3.17
 
2.17
 
2.53
 
2.12
 
2.03 
 
5.11 4.67
Enforcement Mechanisms   
• Objectivity of courts 3.30 3.50 3.27 3.43 2.95 3.41 5.45 4.79
• Influence of money on 
decisions 
4.13 3.86 4.33 4.50 4.15 4.36 1.83 2.16
• Knowing a judge personally 3.09 3.39 3.64 3.63 3.82 3.36 2.02 2.00
• Turning to a higher court 4.77 4.75 3.98 4.43 3.41 4.13 4.91 4.87
      
 
According to Estonian respondents, the problem of “information availability” arose 
“sometimes”, with an average estimate of 3.13 in 1998 and 3.48 in 2000. In 2000, 47 
respondents (33.1%) answered that information was “sometimes” available, 31 respondents 
(21.8%) that information was “frequently” available, and 29 respondents (20.4%) were of the 
opinion that information was “rarely” available. At the two extremes, two respondents were 
of the opinion that information was “never” available and four respondents that it was 
“always” available! In general, entrepreneurs do not seem to be able to get the information 
they wish  about new laws or plans to change existing laws and policies. 
 
Respondents were of the opinion that the possibility of “voicing their concerns and opinions” 
indirectly or directly was quite small. The opportunity to do so was clearly evaluated by 
respondents as rarely available (average estimate 1.73, with a low standard deviation of 0.93 
in 1998 and 2.20 in 2000). In 2000, 56 respondents (39.4%) answered that they are never 
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consulted, and 41 respondents (28.8%) answered that this happens rarely. None of the 
respondents was of the opinion that they are always consulted.  
 
Government announcements were evaluated by respondents as being “sometimes” credible 
(average estimate 2.88 in 1998 and 3.17 in 2000). In 2000, 63 respondents (44.4%) were of 
the opinion that government announcements were “sometimes” credible and 26 respondents 
(18.3%) that they are either “rarely” or else “frequently” credible. Only two respondents 
answered that government announcements are “always” credible. Faith in the “credibility of 
government announcements” is thus quite low, which is typical under the conditions of an 
unstable political and economic environment. 
 
Comparative estimates of legislative procedures are presented in Table 3. The general 
conclusion is that there are great differences between Russia and the Scandinavian countries, 
and Estonia is positioned between them, but closer to Russia. For example, while respondents 
“mostly” had faith in the credibility of government announcements in Finland and in Sweden 
(with average ratings of 5.11 points and 4.67 points respectively), they “rarely” had faith in 
them in Russia (average 2.17 points) and only “sometimes” in Estonia (2.88 points in 1998 
and 3.17 in 2000). It is quite interesting to mention that the credibility of government 
announcements was lower in the Russian towns of Kaliningrad (on average 2.03 points) and 
St. Petersburg (2.12 points) than in the capital Moscow (on average 2.53 points). Only the 
variable “Predictability of law” was estimated similarly in all countries – mainly as 
sometimes unpredictable.    
 
3.3 Law Enforcement Mechanisms 
Variables related to problems with the objectivity and credibility of courts were formulated 
on the basis of specific questions to respondents (see Tables 2 and 3). The variable 
“Objectivity of Courts” was formulated on the basis of the question: “Imagine that a private 
conflict is brought into court with the evidence being very clearly in your favor. Are you 
confident that the assigned judge will enforce the law objectively? Courts can be trusted to 
enforce the law objectively according to transparent rules: never (1), rarely (2), sometimes 
(3), frequently (4), mostly (5), or always (6).” Respondents estimated that this happens 
sometimes, with an average estimate of 3.30. In 2000, 53 respondents (37.3% of respondents) 
were of the opinion that courts can be trusted to enforce the law objectively sometimes, 46 
respondents (32.4%) that this is frequently the case, and 20 respondents (14.1%) that this is 
rarely so. Thus, in most cases, courts are not trusted and economic agents must resort to self-
enforcement mechanisms in the case of disputes.  
 
Respondents evaluated that money frequently influences the decisions of courts (average 
estimate 4.13 in 1998 and 3.86 in 2000). This means that money changing hands influences 
courts: while outright bribery is one method, the wealthy may also be able to buy better legal 
services or pay off the other party. In 2000, 23.9% of the respondents were of the opinion that 
money can change the result of the court case frequently, 31.0% that this is sometimes 
possible, and 28.1% of the respondents that this is mostly possible. Eight respondents were 
sure that this happens always. Money thus seems to play an important role in court cases, a 
statement that is in accordance with widespread public opinion.  
 
Respondents were of the opinion that knowing the assigned judge personally can sometimes 
influence the court procedure and result (average estimates of 3.09 in 1998 and 3.39 were 
given in 2000). In 2000, 48 respondents (33.8% of respondents) answered that this was true, 
35 respondents (24.6%) were of the opinion that this was frequently true, and 31 respondents 
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(21.8%) that this is rarely the case. Personal relationships thus appear to play an important 
role in court cases. At least, it is a widespread perception that this is the case. 
 
Respondents evaluated the demonstration of the will to fight against unfair court decisions as 
a commonly occurring event (average estimates 4.77 in 1998 and 4.75 in 2000). In 2000, 
31.7% of the respondents were of the opinion that they would appeal to a higher court always 
and 32.4% that they would do so in most situations. It is quite surprising that although 
respondents do not trust the objectivity of the courts to any great degree, they are optimistic 
enough to appeal to a higher court in the case of unfair court decisions. A significant number 
of cases have been appealed, sometimes successfully, at a higher court in Estonia.  
 
Comparative estimates of the characteristics of law enforcement mechanism are presented in 
Table 3. The general conclusion is the same as that mentioned above: there are significant 
differences between Russia and Nordic countries, and Estonia lies between them. For 
example, while respondents in Finland and Sweden said that they had faith in the objectivity 
of courts most of the time (average estimates 5.45 and 4.79 points, respectively), respondents 
in Russia and Estonia only sometimes have faith in the objectivity of courts (average 
estimates 3.27 in Russia, 3.30 in Estonia in 1998 and 3.50 in 2000). The demonstration of the 
will to resist and to turn to a higher court in the case of unfair court decisions was quite high 
in all countries and was estimated to occur frequently, even in Russia (average 3.98 points).     
 
3.4 Uncertainties in Government Agency Behavior, Law Making Procedures, and Law 
Enforcement 
In order to gauge whether any positive changes have occurred in Estonia vis a vis the 
uncertainties in government agency behavior, law making procedures and law enforcement, 
respondents were asked to assess the level of changes over  the last five years.  Results were 
formulated on the basis of the question: “Do you think that during the last five years 
uncertainties in dealing with government agencies/ in  law-making /in law enforcement have 
increased (1), remained about the same (2), or decreased (3)?”  The results are shown in 
Table 4.  Although there was a slight improvement with regard to uncertainties in law-
making procedures (average estimate 2.15 in 1998 and 2.30 in 2000) and in law enforcement 
mechanisms (average estimate 2.06 in 1998 and 2.17 in 2000), standard deviations of  these 
estimates were very high. Thus, we may say that in general, Estonia’s uncertainties remained 
at about the same level over a five year period. 
 
Comparing the Estonian  estimates to different uncertainties in Russia, as well as Finland and 
Sweden, it was found that the level of  uncertainties decreased in the two Nordic countries, 
but increased in Russia (with the exception of activity in Moscow.)    These results are shown 
in Table 4. 
 
                                                      Table 4. Estimates of Uncertainties in Different Countries 
 
Estonia Uncertainties… 
1998 2000 
R
ussia 2000 
M
oscow
 
St. 
Petersburg 
K
aliningrad 
Finland 
2000 
Sw
eden 
2000 
in dealing with agencies 1.96 2.28 1.95 2.17 1.76 1.98 2.11 2.41 
In law making  2.15 2.30 1.82 2.03 1.85 1.69 2.55 2.43 
In law enforcement 2.06 2.27 1.78 1.83 1.73 1.79 2.38 2.60 
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4.  Financial and Regulatory Constraints on Estonian Firms 
 
In an attempt to form a picture of financial and regulatory constraints on Estonian firms, we 
interviewed between 50 and 70 managers of firms operating in Tallinn and northern Estonia.  
Before moving on to gauge managers’ impressions about these restraints and their impact on 
business dealings, we examined the makeup of the firms  with regard  to their control and 
ownership structure (Table 5). 
 
The interview studies took place each year beginning in 1994 and ending in 2000. The 
majority of respondents were drawn from small (an average of 37.2% of the sample) and 
medium-size (49.6%) domestically owned private (73.8%) joint stock companies (70.4%) or 
limited liability enterprises (16.5%), which started business on the basis of personal savings 
(58.1%) after the year 1992 (64.1%), and which operate in the capital of Estonia, Tallinn 
(49.2%) and in northern Estonia (28.0%). The control and ownership structure of the firms is 
described in Table 5. Almost all firms had some kind of board of directors (average number 
on the board: 3.1 members) although some firms were managed by a managing director 
alone. In most cases, the distribution of voting rights was the same as the distribution of 
shares, but some of the respondents did not report distribution of voting rights and only one 
firm reported a distribution of voting rights that differed from the distribution of shares (the 
advantage going to the managing director and board members). A decrease over time in the 
share of employees and an increase in the share of board members in the distribution of 
shares are clearly observable. 
 
In the following we study first, in 4.1, sources of financing and financial contractual relations. 
Thereafter we turn to Regulatory Constraints in 4.2, Dispute Resolution in 4.3, and finally 
Business Support Services in sub-section 4.4 
 
. 
 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Shares (%) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
Managing director  21.6 18.4 20.5 15.1 23.9 20.3 17.3 19.6
Board members  17.6 22.3 24.8 30.9 29.7 27.5 41.4 27.7
Employees of the firm  27.5 24.8 21.6 19.5 14.4 11.3 9.8 18.4
Foreign owners  5.9 7.2 5.8 4.5 6.2 6.0 7.9 6.2
Other firms  11.8 12.3 8.4 9.9 14.0 7.7 6.2 10.1
Others (parent firm, 
previous employees etc) 
 
15.6 
 
15.0
 
18.9
 
20.1
 
11.8
 
27.2 
 
17.4 18.0
 
 
4.1 Sources of Financing and Financial Contractual Relations 
 
In this subsection we turn to a more detailed analyses of sources of financing in the period 
1994-2000. We focus on source of finance of latest investments and the role of formal and 
informal loans. 
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Financing of Latest Additional Investment: Financing sources for the latest additional 
investment in 1997-2000 are presented in Table 6. The most important source of funding was 
retained earnings, which were used in 44.2% of total investments, and in 59.1% of 
investments in the form of acquisition of land. The share of bank loans, which was quite 
stable from year to year, was on average 18.5%. Although a number of firms use informal 
borrowing from relatives, friends and moneylenders, these loans are quite small and the share 
of such informal loans as additional sources was only 2.5% on average. The share of other 
financing sources (accumulated depreciation, leasing etc) was on average 19.6% and the 
share of supplier credit was 7.2%. For total investments there seems to be a trend towards a 
declining use of retained earning but the alternative source varies from year to year (% of 
firms indicating choice).    
 
Table 6. Financing Sources of Latest Investment 
 
Land Buildings Financing Source 
1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
Retained earnings 75.0 65.5 58.6 37.5 59.1 45.2 44.3 8.7 26.5 31.1
Personal savings - 21.1 10.0 25.0 14.2 - 0.5 4.6 19.2 6.0
Loan(s) from 
friends or others  
 
- 
 
- 
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
9.2
 
- 
 
- 2.3
Bank loan - 2.3 13.4 - 3.9 35.9 28.8 49.0 30.4 36.0
Supplier credit 25.0 11.1 18.0 - 13.5 - 4.3 7.7 - 3.0
Other sources 
(depreciation etc) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-
 
37.5
 
9.3
 
18.9
 
12.9
 
30.0 
 
24.9 21.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Equipment Total Investments  
Financing Source 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
Retained earnings 43.9 41.1 37.2 47.6 42.5 54.7 50.3 34.8 37.1 44.2
Personal savings 7.1 2.0 0.6 5.8 3.9 2.4 7.8 5.2 16.6 8.0
Loan(s) from 
friends or others  
 
4.2 
 
5.0 
 
4.5
 
6.7
 
5.1
 
1.4
 
4.7
 
1.5 
 
2.2 2.5
Bank loan 16.8 18.2 14.5 13.3 15.7 17.6 16.4 25.6 14.5 18.5
Supplier credit 7.8 10.1 0.2 2.0 5.0 10.9 8.5 8.6 0.7 7.2
Other sources 
(depreciation etc) 
 
20.2 
 
23.6 
 
43.0
 
24.6
 
27.8
 
13.0
 
12.3
 
24.3 
 
28.9 19.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
 
 
 
 Borrowing from Formal Institutions: About half of the interviewed firms reported usage of 
overdraft facilities, most of them receiving overdrafts from one bank and others from two 
different banks (see Table 7). Firms that received loans either during the last year or the last 
five years of the study reported more exact terms and conditions of their loans. While about 
two-thirds of institutional loans were bank loans, the remaining loans were from non-bank 
financial institutions (for example, credit unions), government projects and foundations or 
from parent companies. As a whole, a larger share of firms gained access to loans and leasing 
contracts towards the end of the period. The size of loans has increased, too. Equipment as 
well as land and buildings were used as collateral to an increasing extent. Legal procedures 
seem to have become more important as enforcement mechanisms. We do not observe a trend 
in the average collateral to loan ratio however. Another indication of a hard budget constraint 
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imposed by lenders is that the maturity is prolonged to a lesser extent during the last few 
years. 
 
 
Table7. Borrowing from Formal Institutions 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
Share of firms (%) using:         
    Overdraft facilities 41.9 42.9 45.5 56.3 43.3 45.7 50.0 46.5
    Granted loans 33.3 38.7 47.9 55.1 50.7 63.8 54.0 49.1
    Leasing contracts 22.2 32.6 47.5 60.0 68.7 61.4 65.4 51.1
Share of bank loans (by number)  76.9 74.3 75.2 74.8 73.3 65.0 84.9 74.9
Average annual interest rate 24.6 18.2 16.7 16.6 12.4 12.1 10.8 15.9
Average amount of loans  ? 1.67 3.68 2.12 4.18 3.30 8.12 3.85
Average value of collateral ? 1.22 5.11 5.26 7.30 4.72 7.43 5.17
Collateral/loan ratio ? 0.73 1.39 2.48 1.75 1.43 0.92 1.34
Type of collateral (%):   
    Land and buildings ? 28.2 30.6 36.0 56.7 44.8 66.6 43.8
    Equipment ? 37.7 42.1 32.0 33.3 51.7 23.8 36.8
    Moving assets (stock, cattle etc.) ? 34.1 27.3 32.0 10.0 3.5 9.6 19.4
Penalties in the case of non-payment   
    Interest penalties 42.8 37.6 31.4 27.6 29.0 57.6 53.3 39.9
    Prolonging maturity 28.6 31.2 37.1 17.2 21.1 6.1 6.7 21.1
    Initiating legal procedure 12.6 17.4 14.3 34.5 36.8 27.3 26.7 24.2
    Others (interruption of the loan) 16.0 13.8 17.2 20.7 13.1 9.0 13.3 14.8
Share of firms applying for loans, % 36.8 47.2 62.5 51.1 52.2 42.2 35.8 46.8
Share of accepted loan applications 92.9 89.1 76.6 88.0 82.9 89.5 85.0 86.3
Reasons why the firm did not apply:   
    High interest rates  37.3 3.9 27.3 7.4 10.8 16.0 6.2 15.6
    Avoidance of debt 20.8 19.2 27.3 18.5 10.8 4.0 18.8 17.1
    Do not need a loan 16.7 42.3 36.4 40.7 56.7 48.0 21.9 37.5
    Complicated procedures 8.4 11.5 9.0 3.8 - - 9.4 6.0
    Insufficient collateral, probably 
will not be approved for a loan   
 
8.4
 
23.1
 
-
 
29.6
 
5.5
 
12.0 
 
28.1 15.2
    Other reasons (parent firm is 
helping, already has a large debt etc.) 
 
8.4
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
16.2
 
20.0 
 
15.6 8.6
 
 
Informal Borrowing and Lending: As shown in Table 8, 22.4% of the respondents reported 
the usage of informal borrowing on the average, primarily because fewer formalities were 
involved and because of more favorable interest rates. Relatives and friends, as well as 
owners and parent companies, were reported as the main loan sources, while in some cases 
moneylenders and suppliers/clients were mentioned. Maturity varied from several months to 
several years, but was in most cases one year. The average annual interest rate decreased in 
the final years of the study to 7.9% in 2000. Collateral was only required in some cases, 
equipment being the main collateral. Prolonging the maturity was mostly mentioned in cases 
of non-payment at maturity.  
 
The trend we can observe with respect to informal borrowing is that informal groups have 
become increasingly unimportant, and collateral is used to a decreasing extent. Relatives and 
friends remain the most important source of informal loans. 
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As can be seen in table 8, firms also lend to employees in particular, and secondly to other 
firms. We see no clear trend. A sign of decreasing cronyism is that loans to family members 
and friends have been declining, although the trend is broken in 2000. 
 
Table 8. Informal Borrowing and Lending 
 
Characteristics 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  Mean 
1. Informal Borrowing:         
Share of firms using informal borrowing 18.7 21.2 16.7 24.5 23.9 23.4 28.3 22.4
Main reasons for informal borrowing:       
    More favorable interest rates 33.3 41.6 12.5 8.3 37.5 36.4 26.7 28.1
    More flexible repayment schedule 16.7 25.0 25.0 58.4 - - 6.7 18.8
    Fewer formalities 33.3 - 25.0 - 31.3 54.5 46.6 27.2
    Collateral is not needed - 16.7 25.0 8.3 12.5 9.1 13.3 12.1
    Others (could not obtain a bank loan) 16.7 16.7 12.5 25.0 18.7 - 6.7 13.8
Main loan sources/lenders:       
    Relatives and friends 50.0 58.3 37.5 50.0 77.4 36.4 46.6 50.9
    Moneylenders 16.7 16.7 25.0 16.7 12.9 18.2 20.0 18.0
    Informal groups - 16.7 25.0 16.7 3.2 - 6.7 9.8
    Suppliers or clients - 8.3 12.5 - - 18.2 6.7 6.5
    Others (individuals, parent company) 33.3 - - 16.6 6.5 27.2 20.0 14.8
Average annual interest rate 28.4 22.3 19.8 16.3 11.1 8.1 7.9 16.3
Usage of collateral, % 16.7 22.5 37.5 25.0 25.0 9.1 6.7 20.3
2. Informal lending:       
Share of firms granted informal loans 23.0 34.2 29.6 35.8 37.3 31.1 22.7 30.5
Main loan recipients:       
    Relatives and friends 14.8 27.8 5.3 3.2 8.0 14.3 20.0 13.3
    Suppliers or clients 14.8 - - 17.4 12.0 14.3 10.0 9.8
    Employees 48.2 55.6 73.7 76.7 60.0 57.1 50.0 60.2
    Other firms 22.2 16.6 21.0 2.7 20.0 14.3 20.0 16.7
Average annual interest rate 23.5 18.6 15.4 11.3 9.9 8.8 13.0 14.3
Usage of collateral (%) 33.3 28.4 47.4 21.7 38.1 46.1 60.0 39.3
Penalties in the case of non-payment:       
    Interest penalties - 12.5 20.0 16.7 4.0 8.3 - 8.8
    Prolonging maturity 75.0 50.0 45.0 48.0 32.0 41.7 66.7 51.2
    Initiating legal procedures - 25.0 20.0 22.4 36.0 41.7 22.2 23.9
    Others (use of agents, interruption)  25.0 12.5 15.0 12.9 28.0 8.3 11.1 16.1
Share of firms with the first loan (%) 86.7 75.0 84.2 88.2 72.0 71.4 81.8 79.9
Relationship to the loan recipient:       
    Family member 25.0 12.7 12.5 4.3 8.0 7.7 10.0 11.5
    Relatives or friends 25.0 22.3 12.5 4.3 20.0 15.4 20.0 17.1
    Business relations only 50.0 58.3 75.0 56.5 64.0 69.2 70.0 63.3
    Others - 6.7 - 34.9 8.0 7.7 - 8.1
 
4.2 Regulatory Constraints 
 
Regulations/Restrictions on Firms’ Decisions on Activities: Table 9 lists a number of direct 
restrictions on financial activities as well as on general activities, licensing arrangements and 
joint ventures. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 the highest degree of relevance, the table shows 
average estimates of relevance of the various restrictions. The Estonian economic 
environment appears to be very liberal, without regulations/restrictions on firms’ decisions 
regarding operation. Respondents mentioned domestic finance restrictions, with an average of 
1.75 points on the scale between 1994-2000 and equity capital requirements, with an average 
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of 1.61, as being among the most relevant restrictions regarding decision-making. There is 
clearly a perception of declining restrictions on earnings repatriation, general activities and 
foreign loans. 
 
Table 10 focuses on constraints that affect the cutting of production and the closing down of 
business units. Respondents evaluated the high costs of firing workers as the most important 
restriction on both the closing down the business and on reducing production, at an average 
score of around 3 between 1994-2000. There is no discernible trend. Trade union restrictions 
against firing and government restrictions on selling the enterprise were evaluated as non-
relevant restrictions with an average of 1.43 and 1.64 points respectively. In general, all 
regulations and/or restrictions concerning the operation, expansion or closing down of 
businesses are relatively similar. This implies that the economic environment in Estonia is 
perceived as liberal.  
 
Table 9. Average Estimates of the Relevance of 
Various Regulations/Restrictions Affecting Firms’ Decisions on Activities 
 
Regulations/Restrictions 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
1. Relevance of Restrictions to Firms’ Operating Decisions:  
Domestic finance restrictions 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.98 1.40 1.56 1.83 1.75
Earnings repatriation restrictions 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.40 1.12 1.35 1.25 1.40
Restrictions on activities 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.32 1.31 1.22 1.26 1.26
Capital requirements 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.66 1.43 1.49 1.62 1.61
Exchange restrictions  1.7 1.3 1.2 1.21 1.19 1.23 1.38 1.31
Foreign loan restrictions 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.27 1.19 1.27 1.33 1.45
Restrictions on technology licenses  1.6 1.2 1.3 1.12 1.17 1.19 1.34 1.27
Joint venture restrictions 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.34 1.14 1.13 1.09 1.14
Restrictions on payment of salaries to 
non-residents 
1.2 1.6 1.4 1.29 1.15 1.21 1.09 1.28
 
 
 
Table 10. Restrictions on Reduction in Production and Closing of Business Units 
 
Regulations/Restrictions 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
A. Hindrances to Reducing Production: 
High financial costs of firing workers 3.1 3.5 3.5 2.35 2.60 2.93 3.40 3.05
Government restrictions on firing  1.9 1.6 2.0 1.40 1.57 1.81 1.90 1.74
Trade union restrictions on firing 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.29 1.37 1.48 1.51 1.39
B. Relevance of Hindrances in the Case of Closing Down the Business: 
High financial costs of firing workers 3.0 3.3 3.1 2.58 2.74 3.22 3.25 3.03
Legal procedure of liquidation 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.00 2.25 2.32 2.31 2.18
Government restrictions on firing  1.8 2.5 2.7 1.87 1.98 2.07 2.36 2.18
Government restrictions on the sale of 
enterprise 
1.4 2.4 1.6 1.65 1.43 1.39 1.58 1.64
Trade union restrictions on firing 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.38 1.48 1.52 1.60 1.43
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4.3. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
In order to get an idea of how well the Estonian infrastucture is equipped to deal with settling 
business disputes, we queried managers about the nature of,  first,  conflicts with clients, 
suppliers, competitors, government agencies and commercial banks and second, the method 
of  resolution of these conflicts inside and outside courts.  
 
 Late Payments and Non-Payments by Clients: A large number of respondents, it was found,  
have experienced problems with late payments or non-payment in recent years (on average 
86.6% and 70.3% respectively in the period 1994-2000); and most of the firms had between 
1-5 disputes a year in this period as shown in table 11. The main reasons behind late payment 
or non-payment were clients' difficulties in making payments, bankruptcies and lack of 
consideration towards business partners. The duration of business relations with the other 
party in cases involving late payment or non-payment problems was in general short, 
approximately 1-3 years (in 2000, for example, it was about 2.3 years on average – not 
shown). Dispute resolution and enforcement is an important aspect of contractual relations in 
a market economy. Absence of effective mechanisms creates uncertainty and either market 
failure or private participants may organize their own mechanisms for resolution and 
enforcement. Mafia-like organizations may arise. Table 11 shows our respondents’ answers 
to questions about types of disputes with different parties and resolution mechanisms. In 
about one fourth of cases, it was the first transaction with the other party,. The other party of 
the dispute was usually another domestic firm (81.1% on average) and only rarely a foreign 
firm (7.5% of cases), an individual (5.8%), or a governmental institution (5.6% of cases). We 
can observe that late payment disputes with clients have declined while non-payment related 
disputes have been increasing. 
 
Disputes with clients were resolved primarily through the use of direct bargaining (in an 
average of 92.3% of cases in 1994-2000),. The advice or services of a lawyer were not used 
very often (33.5% of cases). The threat of turning to the police or of taking the case to court 
was made in an average of 12.6% and 38.3% of cases respectively. Slightly more than one 
half (an average of 57.0%) of disputes were settled, and respondents expressed satisfaction 
with the outcome of the dispute settlement in an average of 49.5% of cases. About one half of 
respondents are still doing business with the other party of the dispute. There is no clear trend 
in the type of “other party to the dispute” and in the resolution mechanism. 
 
Late or Non-delivery and Deficient Quality of Inputs/Services: Turning to disputes with 
suppliers in the same table (11), we note that about one third of all firms annually have had 
problems with late delivery or non-delivery of inputs/services. An average of 46.2% of 
respondents in the period 1994-2000 experienced deficient quality of inputs/services. The 
number of times firms have had these problems with suppliers during the years in question 
fluctuated, but was for the most part between 2-5, but some firms have had such disputes with 
suppliers ten or even more times (not shown). The other party of the dispute was typically 
another domestic firm (in an average of 66.6% of cases), but quite often also a foreign firm 
(in 30.0% of cases). As one would expect for supplier disputes, governmental institutions and 
individuals were rarely involved.  
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Table 11. Disputes With Clients and Suppliers (%) 
 
Dispute Characteristics 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
A. Disputes With Clients:          
1. Late payment problems (share) 92.1 88.2 87.3 81.3 89.4 85.1 83.0 86.6
2. Non-payment problems (share) 66.7 70.1 68.9 69.1 71.9 71.1 74.0 70.3
3. Other party of the dispute:       
• Other domestic firm 66.7 78.4 87.5 87.5 75.9 84.6 87.0 81.1
• Governmental institution 18.2 5.4 2.5 2.5 3.4 2.6 4.3 5.6
• Foreign firm 15.1 8.1 7.5 7.5 6.9 7.7 - 7.5
• Individual - 8.1 2.5 2.5 13.8 5.1 8.7 5.8
4. Resolution of disputes:       
• Use of direct bargaining 100 96.2 93.8 80.0 88.1 94.7 93.3 92.3
• Use of private arbitrage - - 5.0 2.5 3.7 5.3 4.3 3.0
• Threat to turn to the police 6.5 13.2 10.5 12.8 15.8 5.3 23.9 12.6
• Use of a lawyer 32.1 34.2 39.4 21.1 35.6 29.7 42.2 33.5
• Threat to take case to court 41.4 36.7 42.1 27.5 37.0 36.8 46.7 38.3
• Share of settled disputes 63.0 54.3 55.5 50.0 59.3 52.6 64.4 57.0
• Satisfaction with the outcome 51.6 52.2 44.4 43.6 54.2 47.4 53.3 49.5
• Still doing business with the 
other party 
60.6 48.9 38.9 40.7 54.2 36.8 64.3 49.2
B. Disputes with Suppliers:       
1. Late or non-delivery problems 22.2 34.2 46.7 37.5 58.2 25.5 32.7 36.7
2. Deficient quality of inputs 38.7 42.1 58.5 37.5 61.9 38.3 46.2 46.2
3. Other party of the dispute:       
• Other domestic firm 61.5 80.0 73.1 45.5 57.4 73.7 75.0 66.6
• Foreign firm 30.8 10.0 26.9 54.5 36.2 26.3 25.0 30.0
• Individual 7.7 - - - 6.4 - - 2.0
• Governmental institution - 10.0 - - - - - 1.4
4. Resolution of disputes:       
• Use of direct bargaining 91.7 86.4 80.8 91.2 91.1 78.9 91.7 87.4
• Use of private arbitrage - - 11.5 - 6.7 - - 2.6
• Threat to turn to the police - 3.2 - - 2.2 - - 0.8
• Use of a lawyer 9.1 12.4 11.5 9.1 13.0 5.6 4.2 9.3
• Threat to take case to court 18.2 8.3 11.5 9.1 4.3 - - 7.3
• Share of settled disputes 61.5 75.6 92.0 82.6 93.3 90.0 91.7 83.8
• Satisfaction with the outcome 46.2 57.2 87.6 73.9 84.4 80.0 73.9 71.9
• Still doing business with other 
party 
69.2 74.2 67.6 80.0 86.7 90.0 91.7 79.9
 
Only 4.2% of respondents reported in 2000 that it was their first transaction with the other 
party, and the duration of business relations with the other party was mainly between 1-3 
years (not shown). Direct bargaining was the main mean of resolving disputes with suppliers 
and was used in an average of 87.4% of cases. A lawyer or private arbitrator was used very 
rarely, as was the threat to take the case to court (used on average in 7.3% of cases). In 
contrast, self-enforcement mechanisms worked quite well, with most disputes being settled 
(in an average of 83.3% of cases) and firms being satisfied with the outcome (in 71.9% of 
cases). The majority of respondents continue to do business with the other party of the 
dispute. The share of firms continuing to do business after disputes has actually been 
increasing. This result may be a reflection of the greater credibility of threats to go to court to 
resolve disputes.  
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Disputes with Competitors, Governmental Institutions, and Commercial Banks: Panel A of 
Table 12 shows disputes with competitors. The main causes were perceptions of dumping, 
unethical competition and breaking of agreements. An average of 14.3% of respondents had 
disputes with their competitors, sometimes more (for example, 22.6% in 2000). These 
disputes remained for the most part unsettled, with an average of only 27.5% being resolved.  
 
 
 
Table 12. Other Disputes and Their Resolution 
 
Disputes Characteristics 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
A. Disputes with Competitors:       
Share of firms having disputes 5.4 12.5 14.9 20.4 13.4 10.6 22.6 14.3
Share of settled disputes - 33.3 - 30.0 22.2 80.0 27.3 27.5
B. Disputes with Government Agencies: 
Share of firms having disputes 18.9 23.4 18.0 26.5 22.4 14.9 26.4 21.5
Other party:        
• Tax Office 85.7 54.8 28.6 30.8 46.7 57.1 57.1 51.5
• Customs Office 14.3 22.6 28.6 38.4 33.3 - 28.6 23.7
• Others (police, consumer  
protection agency) 
- 22.6 42.8 30.8 20.0 42.9 14.3 24.8
Use of direct bargaining 42.9 58.6 71.4 53.9 53.3 28.6 50.0 51.2
Share of settled disputes 42.9 45.0 42.9 30.8 53.3 71.4 78.6 52.1
Satisfaction with the outcome 14.3 22.5 42.9 15.4 46.7 57.1 58.3 36.7
C.Disputes with Commercial Banks:        
Share of firms having disputes 18.4 16.7 10.9 12.2 20.9 14.9 5.7 14.2
Reason for the dispute:       
• Late transfer of payments 57.1 50.0 60.0 66.6 35.7 28.6 66.7 52.1
• Quality of credit services 42.9 25.0 20.0 16.7 42.9 28.6 - 25.2
• Quality of other banking 
services 
- 25.0 20.0 16.7 21.4 42.8 33.3 22.7
Use of direct bargaining 28.6 48.7 60.0 50.0 78.6 42.9 33.3 48.9
Share of settled disputes 28.6 38.8 60.0 50.0 78.6 42.9 33.3 47.5
Satisfaction with the outcome 14.3 45.2 60.0 50.0 71.4 28.6 - 38.5
Still doing business with other party 14.3 56.7 80.0 83.3 78.6 28.6 66.7 58.3
 
 
 
Disputes with government agencies were caused mainly by different interpretations of laws 
and other legal acts. The opposing party in most disputes was the Tax Office (in an average 
51.5% of disputes), followed by the Customs Office (in 23.7% of cases) and, less frequently, 
the police and the Customer Protection Agency. Direct bargaining with the governmental 
institution was used in 51.2% cases of disputes, and about one half of disputes were settled. 
The majority of firms were  dissatisfied with the outcome, with only  an average of 36.7% 
reporting that they were satisfied. However, both the share of settled disputes and the degree 
of satisfaction with the outcome increased significantly during the final years of the study 
period. There is no trend, but large fluctuations from year to year indicate that the agencies’ 
experience in the market environment helped relations with firms. 
 
The main reasons for disputes with commercial banks were the late transfer of payments by 
the bank and the quality of credit services. However, the share of respondents having disputes 
with commercial banks was not very high, with an average of only 14.2% of respondents 
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reporting problems. The fluctuations from year to year in this kind of dispute are substantial, 
while the total seems to be declining during the last few years after a peak in 1998. Less than 
half the firms (48.9%) used direct bargaining in resolving these disputes.  While most of 
these disputes were not settled and only 38.5% of the respondents reported that they were 
satisfied with the outcome, the firms are still doing business with the other party. The share of 
disputes addressed through direct bargaining and the sphere of settled disputes are identical, 
usually to the firm’s satisfaction as well. These figures indicate that the only way to address 
disputes with banks is through bargaining rather than through courts. It is possible that banks’ 
information advantage in court makes court challenges difficult.  
 
Legislation and Enforcement Mechanisms: In Section 2 it was shown that the Estonian legal 
system in 2000 was perceived as weaker than the established systems in Finland and Sweden 
but stronger than the systems in neighboring parts of Russia. According to Table 13, a large 
share of respondents during the years 1994-2000 found that Estonian legislation was 
inadequate for the resolution of disputes and conflicts between economic agents for various 
reasons, including contradictions and weaknesses in certain Estonian legal acts, such as the 
Business Law and the Bankruptcy Law; the lack of various specific legal acts, for example, 
regarding debt legislation and regulation of economic agents; the weakness of the court 
system; and the obstinacy of civil servants. Firms were of the opinion that legal acts should 
be based on real life and not on an ideal theoretical framework which is impracticable.  
 
Only 42.4% of respondents were satisfied with Estonian legislation, and this percentage 
seemed to increase from 1996 through 1999, but it fell again in 2000. Less than half the 
respondents (47.3% on average) were satisfied with the available enforcement mechanisms.  
The perception of enforcement, like the perception of sufficiency of legislation, improved 
from 1996 through 1999 but deteriorates in 2000. The decline is small, however. Most of the 
respondents (66.1%) favored the use of self-enforcement mechanisms, such as, for example, 
dependence on the mutuality of a business relation, to achieve contractual arrangements with 
mutual safeguards. This result strengthens our earlier conclusions that the development of the 
legal framework is not yet satisfactory.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            Table 13. Legislation and Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
Sufficiency of legislation for 
resolution disputes and conflicts 
 
37.5
 
36.7
 
32.5
 
45.8
 
53.8
 
51.1 
 
39.6 42.4
Satisfaction with enforcement 
mechanisms 
 
38.5
 
42.3
 
31.6
 
48.7
 
58.5
 
59.6 
 
52.9 47.3
Support for use of self-
enforcement mechanisms 
 
64.0
 
68.0
 
65.8
 
65.0
 
69.2
 
64.4 
 
66.0 66.1
 
 
 
4.4. Business Support Services  
  
Governmental, Educational, and Other Institutions: Finally, we turn to certain functions 
generally considered important for a country’s business environment. Table 14 shows the 
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main forms of business support services including consulting and legal advice services and 
business contacts. The following five institutions were indicated by respondents as the most 
important institutions supporting business during the observed period 1994-2000: training 
schools (48.9% of respondents reported that they received support from them), commercial 
banks (41.2%), the Estonian Tax Office (38.3.1%), the Estonian Commercial Chamber 
(32.3%), and the Estonian state universities (29.5%). Other institutions mentioned were 
lawyers’ offices, accounting and auditing firms and the Environment Foundation. 
 
Table 14. Perceptions about Institutions Supporting the Business 
(% of firms receiving support) 
   
Institution 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
Training schools 53.8 44.7 39.6 42.9 46.3 44.7 70.2 48.9
Commercial banks 25.6 34.0 43.8 32.7 31.3 42.6 78.7 41.2
Estonian Tax Office 41.0 31.9 29.2 28.6 32.8 39.1 65.2 38.3
Estonian Commercial Chamber 15.4 19.1 31.3 32.6 40.3 36.2 51.1 32.3
Estonian Universities 28.2 40.4 31.3 24.5 22.4 34.0 25.5 29.5
Ministry of Economic Affairs 0 8.5 27.1 14.3 10.4 8.5 10.4 11.3
Estonian Privatization Agency 17.9 14.9 10.4 6.1 7.5 6.4 12.6 10.8
Estonian Labor Office 5.1 4.2 14.6 10.2 7.5 10.6 20.8 10.4
Estonian Export Council 2.5 4.2 16.7 12.2 7.5 6.4 8.5 8.3
Estonian Manufacturers Association 17.7 4.2 6.2 4.1 4.5 4.3 8.5 7.1
Estonian Small Business Association 7.7 8.5 12.5 6.1 4.5 6.4 4.3 7.1
Estonian Central League of Industry 5.1 8.5 12.5 6.1 6.0 4.6 4.3 6.7
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 10.2 6.4 8.3 6.1 7.5 4.3 2.1 6.4
International financial institutions 2.5 6.4 6.2 4.1 6.0 10.6 2.1 5.4
 
 
Commercial Banks: The average estimates made by respondents of the quality of different 
banking services using a five-point scale, with 1 representing poor quality and 5, excellent 
quality are presented in Table 15. The table is arranged according to the perceived average 
quality of service. The ranking of different services remains largely unchanged with the 
exception that “crediting of working capital” has gained quality relatively. 
 
Table 15. Respondents’ Average Estimates of the Quality of Banking Services 
 
Banking Service 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mean 
Arrangement of domestic payments 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.29 4.27 4.15 4.23 4.32
Arrangement of foreign exchange 3.8 4.4 4.0 4.14 4.11 3.84 3.98 4.04
Speed of banking operations 4.1 4.2 4.2 3.86 4.07 3.89 3.91 4.03
Arrangement of foreign payments 3.6 4.1 4.0 4.11 3.90 3.92 3.71 3.91
Financial consulting 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.28 3.10 3.53 3.31 3.49
Crediting of working capital 2.9 3.0 3.6 3.56 3.23 3.18 3.47 3.28
Crediting of investments 1.9 2.7 3.0 3.39 2.92 3.08 3.31 2.90
Budgeting assistance 2.0 2.6 2.4 2.32 2.22 2.57 2.52 2.38
 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
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On the basis of the survey results presented and discussed in this paper, a number of 
conclusions may be drawn with respect to financial sector development and firms’ 
perceptions about the legal and regulatory environment supporting financial transactions: 
 
• Retained earnings and personal savings are used to finance more than 50% of all 
investments. The share of firms borrowing from banks has increased but remains between 
50 and 60%, substantially below levels in Western Europe. The average size of loans has 
increased substantially. 
• Banks are able to enforce loans through legal procedures to an increasing extent. 
• Relatives and friends remain the most important source of informal loans. 
• Government regulations do not seriously affect Estonian manufacturing firms’ decisions 
in relation to operation, expansion or closing down the business.  
• A number of disputes and conflicts exist between economic agents, and Estonian 
legislation is inadequate for resolving these disputes. Furthermore, enforcement 
mechanisms do not function well and the majority of respondents relied on self-
enforcement mechanisms.  
• The quality of banking services has improved and is in general high, but still problematic 
are issues of budgeting assistance, long-term crediting of investments and short-term 
crediting of working capital. 
 
The development of the legal and institutional infrastructure in Estonia seems to be lagging 
relative to the radical changes in the society and success in economic development: 
Sometimes entrepreneurs and managers are not informed clearly about new laws and plans to 
change existing laws and policies. In addition, they have few opportunities to voice their 
concerns and opinions indirectly or directly. The responses also indicate that there was little 
faith in the credibility of government announcements. 
 
Law enforcement mechanisms and especially the court system are sources of dissatisfaction. 
Entrepreneurs and managers have little faith in the objectivity of courts and judges, and in 
most cases economic agents need to resort to  self-enforcement mechanisms in various 
disputes and conflicts. Monetary power is perceived as influencing court decisions to a 
significant degree and personal relations (knowing the judge) influence court procedures and 
outcomes quite frequently according to the respondents. Nevertheless, Estonian entrepreneurs 
and managers are quite optimistic and are willing to appeal decisions deemed unfair to higher 
courts. 
 
The arbitrary use of power among civil servants’ is perceived to be high. There are some 
signs of  “helping-hand” and “grabbing-hand” characteristics of the state in the Estonian legal 
and regulatory environment. Respondents feel that civil servants frequently find ways and 
means to give entrepreneurs and managers a hard time; sometimes they are able to gain a 
position of power and construct a case to blackmail entrepreneurs and managers. Personal 
relations with a civil servant can speed up relevant procedures and sometimes influence 
decisions. This phenomenon can be dangerous, especially in a small society, and generate a 
basis for corruption. 
 
The perception of uncertainty about dealings with government agencies, about law-making 
rules, and about law enforcement mechanisms have not changed significantly during the last 
five years. These uncertainties have remained a concern. 
 
 22
A comparison of government agencies’ behavior, law making procedures, and operation of 
the enforcement mechanism in Estonia, Russia, Finland and Sweden indicates that there are 
major differences among the countries. The legal and institutional environment in Russia is 
significantly less developed than in Finland and Sweden in particular, but also Estonia has 
progressed significantly relative to Russia in terms of quality of institutional environment for 
business. In Russia, and to a lesser degree in Estonia, the influence of bureaucrats’ behavior 
is high, law-making procedures are unclear, and the enforcement mechanism does not 
function well. Uncertainty in dealing with government agencies, in law-making procedures, 
and in operation of the law enforcement mechanism decreased significantly during the five 
years leading up to the end of the study in Finland and Sweden while these sources of 
uncertainty were perceived as increasingly important in Russia. In Estonia the importance of 
these uncertainties neither increased nor decreased during the same period. 
 
In spite of the rapid pace of reform and economic growth in Estonia, it appears from these 
studies of managers’ perceptions that there is room for substantial improvement of the legal 
and the public sector infrastructure supporting transactions between firms and the financial 
sector. 
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